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Abstract  
 
Main cause of accidents is just not always bad luck. Literature on safety has emphasised on the 
facts that accident finally leads to unfortunate consequence. The first step of risk assessment is to 
identify the hazards that are present. The Routine Ship Towage, also called harbour towage, is 
potentially a hazardous operation.  
The main objective of this research is to identify and quantify the important factors impacting on 
the safety of routine ship towage operations in Indian coast. In doing so, initially, the existing 
literature on factors influencing safety of harbour towage operation was analysed to design 
questionnaire. Rest necessary data was collected through questionnaires. Finally, the factor 
analysis (Principal Component analysis) was applied to find grouped dimensions from identified 
hazard variables from literature and subsequently the critical analysis of incident type frequency, 
cause and consequences to get a clear picture of critical safety risk factors. As a result, the 
research found 20 criteria in 6 dimensions safety risk factors such as Crew Incompetency, Rough 
Weather, Poor Work Process, Suitability of Tug Type, Poor Safety Management System, and 
Poor Navigational Risk Assessment. 
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I. Introduction 
In the seamanship a very seldom mentioned and elaborate category of small ships exist known 
as Tugboats. They are considered as ‘workhorses of ports’, very useful for assisting other vessels 
in mooring and un-mooring activities and providing tow service in manoeuvring within the ports 
and on all seas. In literature, the significance of these small ships on the whole maritime economy 
is often neglected but in fact their value is of paramount importance especially in manoeuvring 
during bad weather conditions in limited areas of world ports in particular. Now-a-days tugs are 
the important representative of port infrastructure in harbours worldwide and it is almost 
irremovable part of the business at some port in international relations without their utilization 
(BTA, 2010). 
Accidents don’t just happen on its own but they are cumulative results of series of unsafe 
events, in context to ports such as unsafe water conditions, human error, machinery and 
equipment failure - anyone or a combination of these can turn random events into accidents, 
sometimes with fatalities (Alert!, 2008). 
Ship Towage Operation involves one of the potentially hazardous operations i.e. mooring and 
unmooring of vessels at ports. These operations require an efficient team work as a prerequisite to 
secure safety. Crew members indulging in this operation must be efficiently trained and equipped. 
They must possess ample understanding of their role and responsibilities of their own as well as 
other team members (ETA, 2012). 
From past four decades, researches have been conducted in order to have a better 
understanding of the effects on tug operations which are leading to many accidents in recent times. 
It is a point of consideration that there are different ways in operation of tug in towage operation 
and these mainly differ from place to place. Basically there are two methods to assist a ship, one 
is to push or pull a ship with tug fastened alongside the ship. In this method interaction forces 
have very small contribution. The other method is towing a ship on a line the tug is fastened to 
bow or stern to make a connection with towline near the bow in particular, in this interaction 
forces contributes in a major proportion (IMPA, 2013). The purpose of this research paper is to 
identify hazards associated with mooring and unmooring operations in routine ship towage in 
Indian coastal waters. 
 
1.1. Traffic at Indian Ports 
The port sector of India can be divided into two categories namely Major Ports and Non-
Major Ports. Major ports are those ports which are run and governed by an act of Indian 
Parliament while on the other hand Non Major ports includes private ports, captive ports, ports 
which are owned by state government. In total there are 12 major ports in India along with 176 
Non major ports stretched over 7,212 kilometres of the coastal line of India. 
Ninety percentage of India’s international trade by volume and seventy percentages by value 
are represented by Major and Non-major ports in India.  Data shows that 975 million tonnes of 
total traffic was handled by Indian ports in 2013-14, whereas 40% of the total traffic was handled 
by Non Major ports. There are other coastal vessels which are also contributing to this high traffic. 
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To handle this high volume of traffic, tugs play a vital role in providing safe mooring and 
unmooring operations and assistance to vessels coming alongside. Tug activities has increased 
tremendously in these ports and so is the risk to safety in these towage operations (Mantrana 
Report, 2014).  
 
 
II. Literature Review 
To formulate questionnaire extensive review of international literature was done to identify 
prevailing safety factors around the world. There is high risk when ship is having high speed and 
tug is operating near bow of ship having headway (Henson, 2012). In addition Merkelbach and 
Van Wijnen (2013) in their extensive global survey report emphasized both on ‘safe speed’ and 
safe operating procedure when making connection of towline. Dand (1975) model test report 
stated that there is most likely the tug may drive itself under the bow near the fore body of a ship 
as there are large interaction forces which influence the manoeuvrability of tugs, these forces is 
directly proportional to square of the speed. 
The safety report published by Australian Transport Safety Board statistics shows those 
consequences of accidents involving tugs were collisions, contact damage and capsizing (ATSB, 
2011). An accident reported by International Tugowners Association reveals hydrodynamics 
sphere of influence on tug sailing close to bow of ship was the main reason of fatal collision with 
vessel, and tug capsized. The tug failed to maintain safe distance due to interaction force around 
bulbous bow (ITA, 2012).  
The significance of tow planning to prevent Routine Ship Towage accidents was well 
described by Transport Accident Investigation Commission of New Zealand (TAIC, 2001). The 
associated risk of Girting was mentioned in circular of British Tug Association where barge while 
berthing capsized and foundered due to wrong operational procedure by tug. The tug was acting 
as resistant that lead uncontrolled yawing of barge (BTA, 2010). 
In British Tugowners Association’s Safety delegates Seminar emphasized the significance of 
training and expressed concern over poor seamanship and incompetency of tug crew that are 
leading to high number of safety incidents occurrence (BTA, 2012). The same was stressed by 
Livingstone (2012) for adoption of simulator based training that would boost tug masters 
confidence by increasing their competency in efficient operation of their tug.  
Henson, Merkelbach and Van Wijnen (2013) recognised the significance of competency 
which is attribute to skills, great teamwork and experiential comprehensive training for tug 
captains, pilots, ship’s master and crew involved in towage operations. Importance of following 
standard operating procedure was emphasized by Stockman (2010) report, in which there was 
incident of near girting and ultimately could also have led to capsize of tug.  
In Marine Safety Information Bulletin published by United States Coast Guard underlines the 
significance of Tug Handling techniques in reducing down streaming conditions (USCG, 2009). 
In one of accident where tug was assisting vessel in a narrow channel collided, British Tugowner 
Association in its report emphasized on hazards associated with lack of manoeuvring space which 
SINGH, RAJU / Hazards Analysis of Routine Ship Towage operations in Indian Coastal Waters 
 
 
 
65
may also arise due to navigational obstacle in harbour towage operations (BTA, 2010). The 
EMSA (2010) stressed over the tug approach manoeuvres, stating that Pilots and tug masters need 
to be very careful in towage operations. 
Choosing a Tug type for efficient and safe towage operation is critical as mentioned by 
Henson (2011) in Safe Tug Procedures.  Tugs with propulsion units aft are more prone to safety 
risk as the tug’s stern will come closer to the ship bow that will lead to increase of suction forces 
and consequently the high risk of heavy contact with the bow. He also pointed out that proper tow 
planning can give opportunity to choose right tug type, he proposed greater use of tugs with 
propulsion unit forward as they are less affected by interaction forces and are much safer to 
operate as bow tug. 
The poor maintenance of tug propulsion engine that led to collision between bulk carrier and 
tug was reported as the main cause by Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB, 2006). Details 
of report mentions about breakdown of main engine, due to seepage of clutch oil from discharge 
pipe, this led to loss control over tug propulsion and it made heavy contact with starboard ship 
hull and damaging shell plating.  
TAIC, New Zealand (2000) reported issue of poor communication between crew of ship and 
tug led to safety incident involving man overboard and near capsize of tug. There was inadequate 
communication between bridge and crew at mooring station; and also between pilot and tug 
master.   
European Tugowners Associations (2011) stressed on safety culture and human factor in tug 
operating companies, highlighting casual attitude of  company staff and tug crew due to lack of 
enforcement legislation for safety management system  as they fall below 500 GT for many 
international conventions. Another example Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (ILO, 2013) 
which has provision for suitable hours of rest for seafarers but this cannot be applied to mariners 
engaged on tug boats (ABS, 2002). 
 
 
III. Research Methodology 
This research was aimed at identification and quantification of independent variables i.e. 
Hazards causing threat to dependent variables i.e. safety of routine ship towage. The main 
challenge faced at the time of research was to establish a control group who are involved in safety 
incidents. The best method was to adopt an experimental approach but that would not be ethical 
and practical to have accidents in controlled circumstances to determine the risk factors involved 
in towage operation. Therefore, analytical survey was chosen. The methodology would be 
required for statistically skewed distributions as sample population studied represented a 
particular segment. 
This research was not subjected to extremely structured deductive approach and not able to 
control variables in order to generate data for analysis because it is an exploratory non-
experimental research. Therefore a phenomenological approach is adopted to gather relative 
experiences of people and used active experiences as an open ended enquiry. 
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Questionnaire survey method was adopted to assess the practitioners’ professional experience 
in this research. To compare independent variables and to cross check the results, Likert Style 
questionnaire was utilised (Bryman, 2004). It was aimed at generating particular contemporary 
data in order to identify model of types of safety incidents, their frequency and criticality, cause 
and results (Loughborough, 2010). Questionnaire was designed in such a way that most questions 
were closed, containing measurable factual information; also there was an option of providing 
additional descriptive information and facts. 
  
3.1. Process 
A Pilot survey was carried out by draft questionnaire to verify comprehension, structure and 
precision of the questionnaire prior to the actual survey, by having response of five non-
participants. In order to achieve target participation, the questionnaire was circulated to a stratified 
set of involved organizations and individuals. Total questionnaire distributed were 250 to group of 
Tug Master, Class Surveyors, Ship’s crew, Master Mariners, Maritime Administrators, Harbour 
Master, Towage Enterprise Manager, Safety officers, Pilots, Tug Shipbuilders. 
 
 
IV. Survey Results 
Each and every Questionnaire was given a unique number for reference and the collected data 
was optimized and cleaned (checking for obvious errors and ineligibility). The data was then 
organized and coded for analysis on an Excel spread sheet. 
The Likert element was taken as ordinal data & considered for analysis separately; four 
significance levels have been used, so that respondents could distinguish the difference between 
next levels, as equidistant.  Ordinal data gathered from Likert responses has been analyzed using 
non-parametric testing. One hundred and forty three questionnaires were received by various data 
collection sources mentioned above; forty of these were given by Tug Masters, thirty by vessel 
Pilots and forty by Master Mariners.   
Responses were received from nine states and most of them taken as valid. Gujarat (38), 
Maharashtra (33), Karnataka (14), Kerala (7), Tamil Nadu (15), Andhra Pradesh (13), Orissa (7), 
Delhi (11) Goa (5); Total (143). The collected data was not statistically Normally Distributed by 
analysing Mean, Median, Mode and Standard Deviation; however plotting the histogram of risk 
factor frequency shows a positive skew. Questionnaires Survey depicts that the most frequently 
occurring risk factors (>50%), Refer figure 1, which attributes to risks were: 
 
x Poor Training; 
x Human Factors; 
x No Tow Planning; 
x Poor Tug Handling; 
x Communication Procedure; 
x Substandard Tug Equipment; 
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x Tug Approach Maneuvers; 
x Interaction; 
x Safety Culture; 
 
 
Figure 1: Risk Factor Frequency Percentage 
 
A statistical tool Pearson’s r significant number test was used to assess relationship between 
Risk Factors & Consequence severity significance. The test acknowledged a Strong relationship (r > 
0.39) for four factors: 
 
x Human Factor; 
x Poor Training; 
x Poor Safety Culture; 
x Substandard Tug Equipment 
 
The following guiding principle were used for inferring positive or negative correlations 
(Pearson’s r). 
 
If  r = +.70 or higher Very strong positive relationship  
+.40 to +.69 Strong positive relationship  
+.30 to +.39 Moderate positive relationship  
+.20 to +.29 weak positive relationship  
-.19 to +.19 No or negligible relationship   
-.20 to -.29 weak negative relationship  
-.30 to -.39 Moderate negative relationship  
-.40 to -.69 Strong negative relationship 
 
The test showed a moderate positive relationship (r value between 0.30 - 0.39) for Three Risk 
Factors: 
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x Tug Type 
x Poor Tug Handling 
x Poor Training 
 
 Weak Positive relationship in Tow Planning, whereas negligible relationship was found in 
eleven remaining factors (See Table 1). Severity of consequences was calculated following risk 
assessment guidelines. 
 
Table 1: Pearson’s r Significant Number Test for analysing relationship between Consequence 
Severity and Risk Factor (SPSS Software output) 
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
[Sig.(2-
tailed)] 
Consequence  Relationship 
Interaction 0.000 0.168** Negligible   
Girting 0.000 0.099** Negligible   
Tow planning 0.031 0.201* Weak Positive   
Tug Approach Manoeuvres 0.044 0.07* Negligible   
Poor Tug Handling 0.000 0.393** Moderate Positive   
Speed 0.000 0.165** Negligible   
Poor Supervision 0.040 0.145* Negligible   
Tug type 0.036 0.322* Moderate Positive   
Navigational Obstacle 0.004 0.034* Negligible   
Swell 0.031 0.01* Negligible   
Current 0.000 0.015** Negligible   
Wind 0.001 0.01** Negligible   
Visibility 0.004 -0.040 Weak Negative   
Safety Culture 0.040 0.472* Strong Positive   
Substandard Tug Equipment 0.003 0.447** Strong Positive   
Poor Mooring Equipment 0.024 0.083* Negligible   
Communication Procedure 0.000 -0.387 Moderate Negative   
Human factor 0.041 0.464* Strong Positive   
Poor Training 0.001 0.496** Strong Positive   
Poor Seamanship 0.041 -0.060 Negligible   
** .Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
V. Analysis - Factor Analysis Results (Principal Component Analysis Method) 
Statistical analyses Data were analysed using SPSS 16.0. Factor analysis using PCA (Principal 
Components Analysis) Extraction Method and varimax rotation is applied to analyse the 
association between various risk factors. A factor analysis is useful to identify common 
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underlying dimensions (factors) that consist of items (in this case concerns) that are strongly 
interrelated (Neill, 2013). The selection of factors was based on Eigen values (>1 as threshold), 
while factor loadings were used to interpret the meaning of the resulting factors. Cronbach’s alpha 
was used to decide and interpret upon internal reliability consistency. Threshold value for 
acceptable construct is 0.6, which denotes that the dissimilar items measure one single construct 
and therefore may be grouped. Aggregation was done through averaging the scores across issues 
assigned to a specific factor.  
PCA is a method used for altering the variables in a multivariate data set, A1, A2, A3….Ap into 
new variables, B1, B2, B3…Bp which are uncorrelated with each other and account for decreasing 
proportions of the total variance of the original variables defined as: 
 
B1=x11A1+x12A2+x13A3+…+x1pAp 
B2=x21A1+x22A2+x23A3+…+x2pAp 
B3=x21X1+x22X2+x23X3+…+x2pXp 
  
With the coefficients being preferred; so that B1, B2, B3…Bp are accounted for decreasing 
magnitudes of the total variance of the original variables A1, A2, A3….Ap. (Everitt et al.,2001; 
Gaspersz, 2007; Mulyono et al., 2009).  
  
5.1. Data Screening 
The data was screened for univariate outliers. From overall data, five out-of-range values, due 
to clerical or data collection errors, were identified and logged as missing data.  The minimum 
sample size for factor analysis was identified, with absolute sample size of 143 (using list wise 
omission), with over 8 cases per variable. 
 
5.2. Factor Analysis 
Before proceeding to Principal Component Analysis following assumptions need to be 
checked. The factorability of the 20 items was examined. We have multiple variables with ordinal 
values derived from 4 point Likert scale. There was also need to have a linear relationship 
between all constructs. This is because PCA is based on Pearson correlation coefficients, and 
there needs to be a linear relationship between the construct. Linearity was tested using a matrix 
scatterplot, which was selected randomly for just a few possible relationships between variables 
and tested.  
Some well-known criteria for the factorability of a correlation were used.  Firstly, 15 out of 
the 20 items correlated at least 0.30 with at least one other item, signifying rational factorability.  
Secondly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling appropriateness was 0.699, above the 
suggested value of 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (F2 (335) = 5.091E3, p 
< .05). The diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were mostly over 0.5, supporting 
sampling adequacy i.e. the inclusion of most of the item in the factor analysis.  
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The determinant value of sample data is 3.33E-02 (which is 0.0333) which is more than the 
required value of 0.00001. Hence, multicollinearity is not a found in these data. To sum up, none 
of the questions in the Questionnaire have correlation coefficients particularly high and all of 
them correlate fairly well; therefore, there is no need to consider excluding any questions at this 
stage. 
There are no significant outliers for ordinal values of Likert scale of 4 point used. Outliers are 
important because these can have a disproportionate influence on the results. Viewing at the mean 
values, we can conclude that crew incompetency is the most important risk factor that accounts 
maximum impact on safety; and it has two variables of Human Factor & Poor Training. It has the 
highest mean of 2.67 & 2.63 respectively. 
Internal consistency for variables from questionnaire was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. 
The alpha is acceptable 0.733. Finally, the communalities were all above 0.3; further confirming 
that each item shared some common variance with the other items.  Given these overall indicators, 
factor analysis was conducted with all 20 items. Communalities values show how much of the 
variance in the variables has been accounted for by the extracted factors. For instance over 86% of 
the variance in Human Factor is accounted for while 64.1% of the variance in Girting is accounted 
for. 
Principle components analysis was used because the primary purpose was to identify and 
compute composite coping scores for the factors underlying the Hazards in Routine Ship Towage.  
The initial Eigen values showed that the first factor explained 22.66% of the variance, the second 
factor 15.14% of the variance, the third factor 12.48% of the variance, the fourth factor 10.49% of 
the variance, the fifth factor 8.93% of the variance and a sixth factor 5.18% of the variance.  All 
the six factors had Eigen values of just over one, each factor explaining 12.4%.   
All Six factor solutions were assessed in factor loading matrix using both varimax and oblimin 
rotations.  The identified six factors explained 74.92% of the variance and its ‘levelling off’ of 
Eigen values on the screen plot, and subsequently the inadequate number of primary loadings and 
difficulty of interpreting the Seventh factor and succeeding factors.  There was minor dissimilarity 
between the varimax and oblimin solutions, thus both solutions were assessed in the subsequent 
analyses before determining Varimax rotation for the final solution.  
 
Table 2: Total Variance (SPSS Software output) 
Total Variance Explained 
 Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums Of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total
% of 
Variance
Cumulative 
% Total
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.532 22.662 22.662 4.532 22.662 22.662 3.438 17.190 17.190 
2 3.030 15.149 37.811 3.030 15.149 37.811 3.095 15.477 32.667 
3 2.496 12.482 50.293 2.496 12.482 50.293 2.931 14.655 47.322 
4 2.100 10.499 60.792 2.100 10.499 60.792 2.327 11.633 58.954 
5 1.788 8.939 69.731 1.788 8.939 69.731 2.143 10.715 69.670 
6 1.038 5.189 74.920 1.038 5.189 74.920 1.050 5.251 74.920 
Extraction Method: PCA 
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During analysis, one of the items was disregarded because it did not contribute to a simple 
factor structure and failed to pass a requisite minimum criteria of having a primary factor loading 
of 0.4 or above, and no cross-loading of 0.3 or above.  The item “Speed” did not load above 0.3 
on any factor.  It had a primary factor loading of 0.48 on the third component (which was well 
defined by 4 other items) and a cross-loading of 0.32 on Sixth component for the varimax solution.  
In addition, this item had a floor effect, with 55% of the participants not reporting this Risk factor 
as hazard.  
The principle-components factor analysis of the remaining 20 items, using varimax and 
oblimin rotations was conducted, with the six factors explaining 74.9% of the variance. A varimax 
rotation provided the best defined factor structure.  All items had primary loadings over 0.5 and 
only one item had a cross-loading above 0.3 (Speed).  The factor loading matrix for this final 
solution is presented in Table 3. 
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principle components analysis with Varimax 
rotation for 20 items depicting Risk factors qualified for Hazards (N = 143) 
 
Table 3: Rotate Component Matrix (SPSS Software output) 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Human factor 0.963 0.026 0.167 0.027 -0.066 -0.028 
Poor Training 0.93 0.029 0.165 0.075 -0.027 0 
Tow planning 0.893 0.053 0.086 -0.061 -0.138 0.064 
Poor Seamanship -0.868 0.019 0.057 -0.058 0.1 0 
Swell 0.024 0.918 -0.109 0.019 -0.135 0.142 
Wind 0.024 0.918 -0.109 0.019 -0.135 0.142 
Visibility 0.004 0.852 0.275 -0.002 0.044 -0.138 
Current 0.042 0.789 0.32 0.098 0.064 -0.205 
Interaction 0.084 0.086 0.916 0.142 -0.116 -0.017 
Girting 0.13 0.035 0.728 0.157 -0.174 0.195 
Poor Tug Handling 0.064 0.009 0.721 0.001 -0.321 0.01 
Communication Procedure -0.045 0.087 0.603 0.125 -0.179 -0.031 
Speed 0.102 0.069 0.484 0.311 0.227 -0.322 
Tug Type 0.004 -0.056 -0.081 0.92 0.023 -0.005 
Substandard Tug Equipment 0.043 0.046 0.208 0.837 0.072 0.042 
Poor Mooring Equipment 0.026 0.093 0.047 0.742 -0.087 0.044 
Poor Supervision -0.153 -0.078 -0.097 0.002 0.947 0.086 
Safety Culture -0.153 -0.078 -0.097 0.002 0.947 0.086 
Tug Approach Manoeuvers 0.052 0.076 0.303 -0.106 0.002 0.642 
Navigational Obstacle 0.005 0.06 0.11 -0.192 -0.171 -0.609 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
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VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, these analyses indicated that Six distinct factors were underlying maximum threat to 
Routine Ship Towage safety namely Crew incompetency, Poor Work Process, Rough Weather, 
Suitability of tug type, Navigational Obstacle and Poor Safety Management System. (Refer Table 
4) 
Table 4: Result 
Extracted Risk Factor Risk Factors FrequencyPercentage
Relationship Between 
Risk Factor & 
Consequences 
Crew Incompetency 
Poor Training 89% STRONG 
Human Factor 88% STRONG 
Poor Tow Planning 86% NONE 
Seamanship 48% NONE 
Rough Weather 
Wind 13% NONE 
Visibility 7% NONE 
Current 11% NONE 
Swell 7% NONE 
Poor Work Process 
Poor Tug Handling 74% MODERATE 
Communication Procedure 63% MODERATE 
Girting 46% NONE 
Interaction 53% NONE 
Suitability of Tug Type 
Tug Type 23% MODERATE 
Tug Equipment 58% STRONG 
Mooring Equipment 14% NONE 
Poor Safety Management 
System 
Safety Culture 52% STRONG 
Poor Supervision 22% NONE 
Poor Navigational Risk 
Assessment 
Navigational Obstacle 30% NONE 
Tug Approach 
Manoeuvering 56% NONE 
 
The most potential safety event in RST operations is Collision (eighty two percentage) 
followed by Grounding (fifty two percentage) and Capsize / Foundering (forty eight percentage). 
The most potential consequence is Damage (ninety one percentage) followed by Injury (seventy 
six percentage) and Pollution (fifty nine percentage).  There is also indication of a noticeable risk 
of Loss of Life (sixty percentages). 
As it was evident from analysis that there is a correlation between frequency of Risk Factor & 
consequence significance, the interpretations need to be optimized due to complexity of 
association between factors (a lesser number of Safety Risk Factors can underlie the most 
disastrous accidents). 
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The data was not normally distributed hence the test was not carried out to assess whether 
Safety Risk Factor magnitude had any effect, a simple plot of Safety Factor frequency against 
accident severity showed some increase, however there were: 
x fluctuations; 
x significant maximum Safety Risk Factor frequencies in average ranked incidents; 
x A smaller amount of Safety Risk Factor frequency for the most catastrophic incidents. 
 
Poor training and Poor Tow Planning which are attributed to crew incompetency showed 
substantial amount of risk frequency, in fact Human factor which represents the issue related to 
human element also exhibited high frequency. Moreover, issues related to poor training and 
human element shows strong relationship between risk factor and consequences. 
The Tug type involved in Routine ship towage operation though shows small risk factor 
frequency but it shows moderate relationship with consequences whereas substandard tug 
equipment shows high risk factor frequency and strong relationship with consequences. Hence, 
Suitability of tug type as identified risk factor significantly contributes to threat to RST. 
Poor work process components like communication procedure and poor tug handling and 
interaction are with high risk factor frequency and moderate relationship with consequences. Poor 
Safety Management System which is an attribute of poor implementation of safety culture 
accounting high risk factor frequency and strong relationship with consequences are main cause to 
threat to RST operation. However, Poor navigational risk assessment and rough weather though 
carrying low risk factor frequency and no relationship with consequences were also identified as 
threat to RST operation. 
Safety Risk Factor identified in Indian coastal waters by this Questionnaire survey can be 
further validated by researchers with the help of other data collection tool such as studying 
secondary data i.e. accident and investigation reports relevant to Indian coastal waters or 
extensive interviews of experts & professionals from RST industry. 
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